






























A GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF LAND CONTRACT 
CHOICE 
 
Américo Mendes  





A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice1
 
Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes 
 
Portuguese Catholic University 
Faculty of Economics and Management 
Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327 







 In most of the land tenancy literature the type of contract is exogenous. Also even 
though these contracts vary a lot among farms, between regions and over time, the 
theoretical literature has not always acknowledged this idiosyncrasy. Building on the 
strategic bargaining theory initiated by Rubinstein, this model not only makes the type of 
contract endogenous, but also provides the surplus sharing rules and the conditions giving 
rise to each type of contract, showing how the type and terms of  the contract are tailored to 
fit the characteristics of the parties and their economic environment. 
 Pairwise bargaining is embedded into a market context by putting “competitive 
pressure” on the players through the opportunity they have to break up bargaining and look 
for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out, the outcome of the bargaining 
process depends not only on the characteristics of the players, but also on events outside 
their match and the information they have about them. 
 The model departs from price-taking assumptions. Type and terms of the contract 
result from negotiation and are shaped by the “relative bargaining powers” of the players 
whose relevant components are identified in a precise way in the model. 
 
KEYWORDS: land tenancy, sharecropping, land contract choice, game theory.   
                                                          
1 Paper presented in a Contributed Paper Session of the XXIII International Conference of Agricultural 
Economists, organized by the International Association of Agricultural Economics, in Sacramento 
(California), August 10-16, 1997. 
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1. Main features of the model 
 
 Bernat, Jr. (1987), in conclusion to his survey of the land tenancy literature, points 
out that one of the most obvious deficiencies of these theories “is the absence of explicit 
consideration of the bargaining process. Bargaining plays a major role in only one study. 
Bell and Zusman (1976) modelled the landlord-tenant bargaining process as a Nash 
cooperative game under the assumption that renters outnumber landlords. The situation in 
the United States is the reverse: landlords outnumber renters roughly two to one. Hence, if 
either party has a bargaining advantage, it is likely to be the renter. Recent work on non-
cooperative bargaining may provide some useful insights.” Roumasset  (1979) also pointed 
out that “many of the rich variations of the real world contracts will require a theory which 
incorporates transaction costs and bargaining power into the explanatory framework.” 
 Cooperative game theory like the one used by Bell and Zusman cannot model the 
structure of the bargaining process and the influence it might have on the types of contracts. 
Only extensive form games can do it. So we appeal to non-cooperative bargaining theory 
(Rubinstein, 1982; Sutton, 1986; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) and set up an extension of 
Rubinstein’s original model which describes the structure of the bargaining process. The 
specification of this structure enables to show, in detail, the contents of the “relative 
bargaining powers” of the parties and how they determine the contract choices and the 
surplus sharing rules in each type of contract. 
 The model embeds pairwise bargaining into a market context by putting 
“competitive pressure” on the players through the opportunity they have to break up 
bargaining and look for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out the 
outcome of any pairwise bargaining process may depend not only on the characteristics of 
the two players in the bargaining process, but also on events outside their match and the 




 The model is based on the following set of assumptions. 
 
 Assumption A1 
 There are two types of agents in the market: the farmland suppliers labelled as 
“landlords” and the farmland demanders labelled as “tenants”. 
 
 Assumption A2 
 Agents from opposite sides of the market may join to form two person coalitions 
with some common goal that none can completely attain alone. 
 
 Assumption A3 
 The value of each two-person coalition in the land tenancy market depends on the 
“identities” of its members (e. g. location and quality of the land, professional qualification 
and trustworthiness of the players). 
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 Assumption A4 
 The partners in a coalition have conflicting interests about the division of the value 
of the coalition and no agreement may be imposed on any partner without his approval. 
 
 Assumption A52
 The value of a coalition can be divided among its members in infinitely many ways 
(the set of alternatives is a continuum). 
 
 Assumption A6  
 Each player has to incur costs to gather information about the identities of the other 
players. However, once a partner is located, the two parties in the match become 
immediately and perfectly informed about the characteristics of each other including their 
reservation incomes and the surplus that can be generated by their partnership. 
   
 Assumption A7 
 Partner substituability is possible, that is, no party in a coalition is an essential 
member of that coalition. So there is a possibility to switch partners. 
 
 These assumptions characterize the farm tenancy market as involving a search 
problem, a bargaining problem and matching problem. 
 The search problem results from the fact that each agent in the market is not 
completely informed about the “identity” of potential partners. Therefore there are “search 
costs” to locate them. The number of contacts made in a given time interval depends on the 
resources spent on search. So there is an economic decision to be taken about the optimal 
level of search intensity. 
 The matching problem results from the fact that forming a coalition depends on 
whether it can generate a surplus relative to the players’ reservation incomes which depend 
on the “identities” of the partners. Therefore not all the contacts resulting from an agent’s 
search activity need to result in a match. To be so the match has to be “admissible”, that is, 
it has to generate a positive surplus. 
 The bargaining problem results from the fact that there is, a priori, no unique way to 
distribute the surplus. That has to be determined by negotiation between the partners. 
Assumption A2 limits the model to the case of bilateral bargaining. 
 This paper presents only the bargaining model. For the search and the matching 
models the interested reader should refer to the dissertation from which this work comes 
from. So we will proceed with the list of assumptions keeping only those which are 
relevant for the bargaining model. 
 
 Assumption A8 





                                                          
2 Van Damme et al. (1990) showed that this assumption is needed to obtain a unique perfect equilibrium for 
the bargaining game.    
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 Assumption A9 
 The bargaining process is divided into discrete bargaining time periods. There is no 
end point time constraint for the negotiation period, that is, two agents can keep on 
negotiating as long as it is in their interest to do so. However, extension of the negotiation 
period will make the production period shrink. 
 
 Assumption A10 
 The value of the expected surplus shrinks as the negotiation process goes on3. It is 
assumed that it shrinks at a constant positive rate δ . To simplify things further, we 
consider that both players estimate this rate at the same value and we will denote the 
corresponding discount factor by rt = +[ / ( ) ]1 1 δ t . 
 
 Assumption A11 
 This negotiation is assumed to evolve as a bargaining game with alternating offers: 
in each time period no agent can make an offer at the same time as the other agent and the 
offers are ephemeral4, so that an agent does not have to commit to an offer for more than 
one bargaining period. 
 
 Assumption A12 
 The agent who makes the first offer comes from the short side of the market. 
 
 Assumption A13 
 The bargaining process terminates when an offer is accepted and the accepted offer 
is the one that will actually be implemented5. 
 
 Assumption A14 
 The players can take outside options, that is, a player facing an outstanding offer 
can reject it, quit the current partner and look for an alternative partner. 
 
 Assumption A15 
 The players’ strategies are semi-stationary in the following sense: there is no recall 
between market periods so that a player’s strategy in the current negotiation is not 
conditional on the history of previous matches where the player was involved. However, 
within the same market period and within the same match there is perfect recall, that is, the 
actions prescribed by a player’s strategy at each stage of the current bargaining process 
depend on what has happened in the previous stages. 
 
 
 Assumption A16 
                                                          
3 This shrinkage can be interpreted as denoting the fact that an extension of the negotiation reduces the 
production period with a consequent decline in the expected output.  
4 Stahl II (1990) showed that this assumption is needed to obtain a unique perfect equilibrium for the 
bargaining game.  
5 Muthoo (1990) showed that this assumption is needed to obtain a unique perfect equilibrium for the 
bargaining game.  
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 The players have perfect information about the structure of the game. 
   Given these assumptions, player i’s strategy is the function that assigns to every 
possible stage of the bargaining process one of the four possible actions: 
 an offer to make to his partner; 
 an acceptance of an outstanding offer made by his partner; 
 a rejection of an outstanding offer, without threatening to opt out; 
 a rejection of an outstanding offer along with the threat to opt out. 
The bargaining process starts with an agent, say agent j, making an offer to the 
partner, say agent i, about the distribution of the expected surplus. The bargaining process 
then evolves as follows: 
 agent i can either accept or reject j’s offer; 
 if i accepts the game is over with surplus distributed according to j’s offer; 
 if i rejects, j can search among the pool of unmatched agents in the opposite side 
of the market and eventually find a more profitable partner; 
 if i does not take an outside option, j can make a counter offer to i and then the 
process repeats itself with i and j switching roles. 
 Agents i and j can keep the negotiation going, but they have two economic 
motivations not to go on forever: one is the shrinkage in the value of the expected surplus 
as the negotiation goes on; the other is the possibility that the partner may quit the 
negotiation and take an outside option. 
Both agents have perfect information about the structure of the game, that is, their 
information sets are singletons. 
Since there is no recall between market periods, the analysis can be limited to a 
single market period without having to take into account the histories and outcomes of 
previous market periods or the expectations about future market periods. 
 




 There is a unique market equilibrium characterized as follows: all agents who are 
able to match for negotiation reach an agreement. 
 
 To specify their equilibrium strategies we need the following notation: 
 e is the surplus generated by the match defined as follows: 
(1) e y i j= − −α α  
where  y is the joint income of the match and α k is the reservation income of player 
k; 
 is the probability player k has of finding an alternative partner; pk
 βk is the expected value of player’s k outside option, that is, the income he is 
expected to get in case he breaks up the negotiation with the current partner and 
looks for an alternative one. 
In the dissertation where this work comes from we derive the expressions relating 
and pk βk with the parameters and the technologies of the search and matching 
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processes (number of landlords/number of tenants, search intensities, etc.). The 
interested reader should look there for these results. 
 
Let j denote the agent who makes the first offer and i the agent who moves after. 
Their equilibrium strategies are then characterized as follows. 
 
Case I: Both players prefer to continue bargaining rather than threatening to take 
up their outside options 
 
If , j offers at the beginning of the negotiation period the following 
division of the surplus 







and i immediately accepts. 
 
Case II: Player j threatens to take up his outside option but player i doesn’t 
 
If , j offers at the beginning of the negotiation period the following 
division of the surplus 















1 1 1 12 2( ) ( )
β
 and e e ei j= −  
if e p re pj j j> − +( )1 jβ  
(3b)  and  if ej = e jei = 0 e p re pj j j≤ − +( )1 β  
and i immediately accepts the offer. 
 
Case III: Player j does not threaten to take up his outside option but player i does 
 
If , j offers at the beginning of the negotiation period the following 
division of the surplus 

















1 1 1 12 2
( )
( ) ( )
β
 and e e ei j= −  
if e p p r e rei i i j> + − −β ( ) (1 )  
(4b)  and  e j = 0 e ei =
and i immediately accepts the offer. 
 
Case VI: Both players threaten to take up their outside options 
 
If  and , j offers at the beginning of the negotiation period the 
following division of the surplus 


























 and  e e ei j= −
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if e p p r e p p rei i i j j j j> + − − − −β β( ) [ ( )1 1 ]
i i
 
(5b) e e pj = − β  and e pi i i= β  if e p p rej j j j≤ + −β ( )1  
and i immediately accepts the offer. 
 
The proof of this proposition following the method used by Shaked and Sutton 
(1984) is contained in our dissertation and will be omitted here. 
 
4. Types of contract choices 
  
 From the results in the previous section it is possible to typify 68 possible contract 
choices, depending on the combinations of the following elements which are the 
ingredients of the players’ bargaining powers: 
1.  probabilities of getting outside options ; ( , )p pi j
2.  player who is the first to make an offer in the bargaining process; 
3.  player’s impatience; 
4.  surplus of the match (“high surplus” match or “low surplus” match). 
 
Table 1: Structure of the bargaining process and types of contract choices 
   
Probabilities Landlord is the first mover Tenant is the first mover 
of finding an High surplus Low surplus High surplus Low surplus 
outside option r<1 r=1 r<1 r=1 r<1 r=1 r<1 r=1 
pT=0, pL=0 S1 S(50:50) --- --- S2 S(50:50) --- --- 
pT=0, 0<pL<0 S3 FR1 HM3 HM3 S3 FR1 HM3 HM3 
pT=0, pL=1 S3 FR1 HM3 HM3 S3 FR1 HM3 HM3 
0<pT<1, pL=0 S4 HM1 FR3 FR3 S4 HM1 FR3 FR3 
pT=1, pL=0 HM1 HM1 FR3 FR3 S4 HM1 FR3 FR3 
0<pT<1, 0<pL<1 S3, S4 S3, S4 HM2 HM2 S3, S4 S3, S4 FR2 FR2 
0<pT<1, pL=1 S4 S3, S4 HM2 HM2 S3 FR1 FR1 FR1 
pT=1, 0<pL<1 S4 HM1 HM1 HM1 S3 S3, S4 FR2 FR2 
pT=1, pL=1 S4 HM1 HM1 HM1 S3 FR1 FR1 FR1 
 
 “High surplus” matches are those whose surplus is such that it is possible for a 
player to make an acceptable offer to his partner and still capture part of the surplus. When 
this is not the case it is a “low surplus” match. “High surplus” matches correspond to 
equations (2), (3a), (4a) and (5a). “Low surplus” matches correspond to equations (3b), 
(4b) and (5b). 
 
Share contracts without fixed payments (50:50, S1 and S2) 
 
 The model predicts that a share contract without fixed payments will be chosen in 
situations meeting the following conditions simultaneously: 
1.  the match has a “high surplus”; 
2.  all land put up for tenancy is taken and there are no tenant willing to take more 
land (pL=0) nor landlords willing to lease out more land (pT=0).  
 The surplus earned by each player is a linear function of the joint surplus with no 
fixed payment component. There are three different situations to distinguish: 
 
A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice                                                                                  8 
 
1. The players are “patient” (r=1) 
This is the case of the 50:50 share tenancy contract6. 
 
2. The players are “impatient” (r<1) and the landlord is the first mover (contract 
type S1) 
In this case the landlord gets a better share than the tenant. The surplus earned by 











3. The players are “impatient” (r<1) and the tenant is the first mover (contract 
type S2) 
In this case the tenant gets a better share than the landlord. The surplus earned by 











 This type of contracts corresponds to situations where the bargaining powers of the 
tenants and landlords are balanced: none of them has a credible threat to opt out and joining 
efforts yields a higher income than operating independently. Both parties share the risks of 
production uncertainty equally (50:50 contract) if they are both “patient”, or with some 
advantage for the first mover if they are “impatient”. Since none of the parties has a 
credible threat to opt out, intercontractual externalities have no role to play here. The 
surplus shares are determined only by the characteristics of the parties, without interference 
from their outside options. 
 
Share contracts with fixed payments (S3 and S4) 
 
 In this type of contracts the parties receive a variable payment proportional to the 
joint surplus of the match and a fixed fee paid by one party to the other. The model predicts 
that this type of share tenancy will be chosen in situations which meet simultaneously the 
following conditions: 
1.  the match has a “high surplus”; 
2.  at least one of the parties has a probability to get an outside option; 
3.  the players are “impatient” and if the landlord is the “first mover” and the tenant 
can get an outside option for sure the landlord should also have some probability 
to get an outside option, or 
4.  the players are “patient”, both have some probability to get an outside option, but 
the “second mover” cannot get it for sure. 
 There are 19 possible contract choices of this kind listed in table 1 which we can 
classify in two types of contracts: 
1.  Type S3 contracts: the fixed fee is paid by the tenant to the landlord; 
2.  Type S4 contract: the fixed fee is paid by the landlord to the tenant. 
Table 1 defines conditions on the values of the rate of time impatience, the values of 
the probabilities of getting an outside option and the identity of the “first mover” 
                                                          
6 With a different model Allen (1985) gets the same kind of contract for r=1. 
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determining which of the 19 possible contract choices will arise. The corresponding surplus 
sharing rules can be obtained by evaluating equations (3a), (4a) and (5a) for those sets of 
conditions. 
These share contracts differ from the previous ones (without fixed payments) by the 
fact that the bargaining powers of the parties are less balanced: partnership still yields more 
income than independent operation, but one or both parties have a credible threat to opt out. 
So intercontractual externalities are bound to play a role. More precisely, they are taken 
into account in the fixed payment received by the player who has a credible threat to opt 
out. 
 
Fixed rent contracts (FR1, FR2 and FR3) 
 
The fixed rent contract will be chosen in the following situations: 
1.  tenants have stronger bargaining power than the landlords (the match has a “low 
surplus”, matched tenants can find alternative partners, either tenants or 
landlords can make the first offer, but when the landlord moves first he has no 
chance to find alternative partners);  
2.  landlords have stronger bargaining power than tenants (the match has a “high 
surplus”, the parties are “patient”, matched landlords can find alternative 
partners, but matched tenants can’t); 
3.  the match has a “high surplus”, the parties are “patient”, tenants make the first 
offer and have some chance to find alternative partners, but matched landlords 
can get alternative partners for sure. 
 In the “high surplus” matches the rent is equal to the full expected value of the 
landlord’s outside option (contract type FR1): eL L= β . 
 In “low surplus” matches the rent is equal to the following values: 
i)  the landlord’s reservation income, when the landlord does not have any chance to 
get an alternative partner (contract type FR3): eL L= α ; 
ii)  a fraction of the expected value of the landlord’s outside option, when the 
landlord has some chances to find an alternative partner but doesn’t get it for sure 
(contract type FR2): e pL L L= β ; 
iii) the full expected value of the landlord’s outside option, when the landlord is 
sure of finding an alternative partner (contract type FR1): eL L= β . 
 When the tenant has a very strong bargaining power the landlord’s rent is such that 
all the surplus of the match goes to the tenant (contract type FR3). 
 If the landlord’s bargaining power is not weak (he owns a good quality holding, or 
has a credible threat to opt out), intercontractual externalities play a role and the landlord 
gets a better share which takes into account the expected value of the outside options 
(contract type FR1 or FR2). 
  
Hired management contracts (HM1, HM2 and HM3) 
  
We call “hired management contracts” the ones where the tenant gets a fixed 
payment and the landlord is the residual claimant. In the land tenancy literature these are 
called “wage contracts”. We don’t think this is an appropriate designation. The land 
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contracts are deals between suppliers of two basic inputs: one party supplies essentially 
land and the other supplies essentially managerial skills and labour monitoring ability, 
including monitoring of the tenant’s own family labour. So these are basically managerial 
contracts which should be distinguished from labour contracts (fixed wage contracts or 
others). 
 The hired management contracts will be chosen in the following situations: 
1.  the match has a “low surplus”, matched landlords can find alternative partners, 
either landlords or tenants can make the first offer, but when the tenant moves 
first he has no chances to find alternative partners; 
2.  the match has a “high surplus”, the parties are “patient”, matched tenants can 
find alternative partners, but matched landlords can’t; 
3.  the match has a “high surplus”, the parties are “patient”, landlords make the first 
offer and have some chances to find alternative partners, but matched tenants can 
get alternative partners for sure; 
4.  the match has a “high surplus”, the parties are “impatient”, matched tenants can 
find alternative partners for sure, landlords make the first offer and have no 
chance to find alternative partners. 
 In “high surplus” matches the tenant earns the full expected value of his outside 
options (contract type HM1): eT T= β . 
 In “low surplus” matches the tenant’s surplus has the following values: 
i)  the tenant’s reservation income, when there is no chance to find an alternative 
partner (contract type HM3): eT T= α ; 
ii)  a fraction of the expected value of the tenant’s outside options, when there is 
some chance to find an alternative partner but the tenant cannot get it for sure 
(contract type HM2): e pT T T= β ; 
iii) the full expected value of the tenant’s outside options, when he is sure to find an 
alternative partner (contract type HM1): eT T= β . 
 When the landlord has a very strong bargaining power, no surplus goes to the tenant 
and so all the surplus goes to the landlord (contract type HM3). 
 If the bargaining power of the tenant is not weak (he has a good entrepreneurial 
ability, or a credible threat to opt out), intercontractual externalities play a role and the 
tenant gets a better surplus share which takes into account the expected value of the outside 
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